NSC BRIEFING

27 May 1954

## HONDURAS ASKS US AID AGAINST COMMUNIST THREAT

- I. Honduras says cannot guarantee life and property against "international Communism." Note asks US to:
  - A. Cooperate with Honduras, under Rio Treaty, "in facing dangers"
  - B. Dispatch two warships to stand off Honduran north coast.
  - C. Detain ships bringing Orbit arms to Guatemala.
- II. Honduras sees threat as both internal and from Guatemala.
  - A. Internally Communists exploiting general strike.
    - 1. Communists seek to control
      35,000 employees of two US-owned
      fruit companies etc.
    - 2. Overt strike leaders dominated by hidden Communist leaders.

OSD & DOS review(s) completed.

**OSD REVIEW COMPLETE** 

- 3. Communists sabotaging non-Communist attempt at settlement with Standard Fruit Company.
- 4. Honduran Communist Party reportedly being organized at Progreso, striker stronghold.
- 5. Communists oppose government participation in United Fruit negotiations.
- 6. Strikers hitherto well disciplined, but situation explosive.
  - a. Strikers said to be armed.
  - b. Strikers becoming defiant of government.
  - c. Government probably could not enforce martial law.
- 7. Ambassador Willauer believes Communists want strong government

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- B. Honduras fears Guatemalan intervention.
  - 1. Alarmed by 15 May arms shipment to Guatemala.
  - 2. Guatemalan troops reported at border by Hondurans.
    - a. Guatemalans claim troops pursuing railroad saboteurs near border.
    - b. Overt Guatemalan invasion unlikely.
  - 3. Greater danger is Guatemala's capacity to arm Honduran strikers.
    - a. Weapons in hands ofHonduran strikers before15 May said to be Guatemalan.

25X1

- III. Viet Minh redeploying fast from D.B.P.
  - A. 25 May Division 351 near Tuyen
    Quang base.
  - B. Other divisions well east Dien Bien
    Phu, heading bases north, south
    delta.
  - C. Early June arrival indicated rather than 20 June.
  - D. Enemy intentions unclear.

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 Consensus observers is: enemy decision will be on basis political strategy Geneva, assessment French strength, morale

delta.

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- IV. O'Daniel estimates if enemy attacks next 30 days, French could only hold Haiphong beachhead, without substantial reinforcement.
  - V. French trying strengthen delta.

    There from

    A. Redeploying French forces else
    where Indochina:
    - 1. All or most 15 French battalions ...
      W Laos to move to Delta.
    - Five from other areas already moved.
    - 3. Three now on water, one goes to delta, 2 to Saign aug.
    - overseas. pending decisions after
      - 1. Eight battalions (5,000 men)
        to be sent quickly fun North
        afuia or France
      - 2. Decision on 3 further divisions awaiting General Ely's return.

Phane 5

Whase 3

- Paris may call October class 3. in July, to release regulars for Indochina.
- Study reduction Tonkin perimeter. C.
  - One plan: withdraw north Red River-Bamboo Canal.
  - 2. Another plan: hold Hanoi-Haiphong corridor.
- Such contraction: D.
  - Means abandonment Catholics south delta.
  - 2. May account rumors evacuation French dependents.

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- VII. Political field. Many reports continuing governmental deterioration, revolt, civil war, rioting. Former premier described present situation as a "complete crisis of confidence."
- VIII. Cochinchina. Gangster Binh Xuyen about wrecked security Saigon.
  - A. Hundreds police resigned disgust.

    Law enforcement "dropped to nothing."
  - B. Binh Xuyen to support cab drivers overcharging passengers: fears of antiwhite rioting.
  - C. Binh Xuyen, with police arsenal,
    may well battle local Vietnam army
    units; trying to establish autonomous position. Also may fight Hoa
    Hao, Cao Dai.

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B. Prince Petsarath is one of three half-

brothers, all cousins Laos King.

Half-brother #1 (Souvanna Phouma) is

Laos Premier: #2 (Souphanou Vong) is

rebel head Viet Minh shadow government.

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E. Petsarath very popular: if merely joins present government, could strengthen it.

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- D. Saigon press indulged unprecedented anti-US campaign; speaking US "imperialism," Soviet "benevolence." Shows Viet Minh penetration.
- E. Hinh believed planning revolt against Bao Dai. Only awaiting fall Tonkin where his popular opposition located.
- IX. Central Vietnam. Picture "precarious and discouraging."
  - A. Security about non-existent.
  - B. Local militia rather shoot each other than Viet Minh.
  - C. Peasants streaming into Hue, many Viet Minh.
- X Laos. Soon to be stripped French troops, possibly faces coup.